Numbers 35

Translator Notes

1. The location formula be'arvot Mo'av al-Yarden Yericho ('in the plains of Moab by the Jordan at Jericho') anchors this legislation in the same geographic setting as the preceding chapters — the final encampment before crossing the Jordan. These instructions about Levitical cities and cities of refuge represent some of the last legislation given in Numbers, establishing judicial infrastructure for life in the promised land.

Translator Notes

1. The Levites receive no tribal territory of their own — they are landless by divine design (cf. Numbers 18:20-24), with God Himself as their inheritance. Instead, other tribes must give (venatenu laLeviyyim — 'they shall give to the Levites') from their own nachalat achuzzatam ('the inheritance of their land holdings'). They receive two things: arim lashevet ('cities to dwell in') and migrash ('pastureland, open land') surrounding those cities. The word migrash from the root g-r-sh ('to drive out, expel') refers to open ground extending beyond the city walls — land 'driven out' or cleared of structures.

Translator Notes

1. The distinction between the cities (for dwelling) and the migrash ('pasturelands') is functional: livhemtam ('for their cattle'), lirkhusham ('for their property, goods'), and lekhol chayyatam ('for all their living creatures'). The Levites needed grazing land for the livestock they received through tithes and their portions of the sacrificial system. The word chayyah ('living creature, animal') is broader than behemah ('cattle, domesticated animal'), encompassing all livestock.

Translator Notes

1. The inner pastureland zone extends miqqir ha'ir vachutsa elef ammah saviv ('from the wall of the city outward one thousand cubits all around'). A cubit (ammah) is approximately 18 inches or 45 centimeters, making this zone roughly 1,500 feet or 460 meters in every direction from the city wall. This establishes a defined ring of Levitical grazing land surrounding each city.

Translator Notes

1. The relationship between the one-thousand-cubit measurement (v 4) and the two-thousand-cubit measurement here has generated centuries of rabbinic discussion. The Talmud (Eruvin 56a-b, Sotah 27b) resolves it by distinguishing between an inner zone designated for pasture (1,000 cubits) and an outer zone for fields and vineyards (an additional 1,000 cubits). The fourfold specification — pe'at qedmah, negev, yam, tsafon ('east, south, west, north sides') — with veha'ir battavekh ('the city in the center') creates a precise, measured grid of Levitical territory extending in all four cardinal directions.

Key Terms

Translator Notes

1. The shesh arei hammiqlat ('six cities of refuge') are introduced here — from the root q-l-t meaning 'to absorb, receive, shelter.' These are not additional to the forty-eight Levitical cities but included within them: six out of the total serve the specific purpose of sheltering a rotseach ('one who kills, manslayer'). The remaining arba'im ushtayim ir ('forty-two cities') complete the total. Placing the refuge cities under Levitical administration ensures they are governed by those trained in Torah — qualified to adjudicate the complex distinction between murder and manslaughter.

Translator Notes

1. The final count: arba'im ushemoneh ir ('forty-eight cities') plus their migrash ('pasturelands'). This amounts to roughly four cities per tribe of Israel, distributed across the entire land, ensuring a Levitical presence in every region. The Levites thus serve as a spiritual infrastructure — dispersed among the tribes rather than concentrated in one territory, providing teaching, judicial expertise, and religious leadership throughout the nation.

Translator Notes

1. The allocation principle is proportional: me'et harav tarbu ('from the larger, give more') and me'et hame'at tam'itu ('from the smaller, give fewer'). This equity principle — ish kefi nachalato ('each according to his inheritance') — ensures no tribe bears a disproportionate burden. A tribe with extensive territory contributes more cities; a smaller tribe contributes fewer. The pe paragraph marker closes the Levitical cities section and transitions to the cities-of-refuge legislation.

Translator Notes

1. A second divine speech formula opens the cities-of-refuge legislation proper (vv 9-34). This section moves from the administrative question (how many cities, where located) to the judicial question (who qualifies for refuge, under what conditions, and what distinguishes murder from manslaughter). The separate speech introduction signals a distinct legislative unit within the broader chapter.

Translator Notes

1. The temporal marker ki attem overim et-haYarden artsah Kena'an ('when you cross the Jordan into the land of Canaan') anchors the legislation to the imminent conquest. These laws are prospective — they will take effect upon entry into the promised land. The verb overim ('crossing') is a participle suggesting imminence: 'you who are about to cross.' The refuge system must be established as part of the initial settlement infrastructure.

Translator Notes

1. The verb vehiqritem ('you shall select, designate, make happen') from q-r-h has the connotation of arranging or making something occur — the cities must be deliberately designated, not randomly assigned. The qualifying condition is critical: the killer must have acted bishgagah ('unintentionally, by accident, in error') from the root sh-g-g ('to err, go astray'). This word creates the legal foundation for the entire chapter — the distinction between accidental killing (which qualifies for refuge) and intentional murder (which does not). The phrase makkeh-nefesh ('one who strikes a person dead') uses nefesh for the victim's life.

Translator Notes

1. The cities provide miqlat migo'el ('refuge from the redeemer/avenger'). The go'el is the kinsman-redeemer who has both the right and the duty to act on behalf of a slain relative. The fundamental principle: velo yamut harotseach ad-omdo lifnei ha'edah lamishpat ('the killer shall not die until he stands before the community for judgment'). The right to a fair trial before the edah ('community assembly') takes precedence over the go'el's right of blood vengeance. This represents a remarkable legal restraint on private retribution.

Translator Notes

1. The number six is reiterated for emphasis: shesh arei miqlat tihyenah lakhem ('six cities of refuge they shall be for you'). The specific number ensures adequate geographic coverage — enough cities that anyone in the land can reach one within a reasonable distance — while keeping the number sufficiently limited that each city can maintain the judicial expertise needed to adjudicate homicide cases.

Translator Notes

1. The geographic distribution is balanced: shlosh he'arim me'ever laYarden ('three cities beyond the Jordan') and shlosh he'arim be'erets Kena'an ('three cities in the land of Canaan'). With two and a half tribes east and nine and a half west, this provides proportionally greater access for the smaller Transjordanian population. Deuteronomy 4:41-43 identifies the three eastern cities as Bezer (for Reuben), Ramoth-gilead (for Gad), and Golan (for Manasseh).

Translator Notes

1. The eligibility extends universally beyond ethnic Israelites: livnei Yisra'el ('for the Israelites'), velagger ('for the resident foreigner'), and velatoshav ('for the temporary settler'). The ger (long-term resident alien) and toshav (short-term sojourner) have equal access to the refuge system. Justice in capital cases is universal, not ethnic — a remarkable provision in the ancient Near East. The qualifying phrase bishgagah ('unintentionally') is repeated, reinforcing the core legal distinction of the chapter.

Translator Notes

1. The first category of murder: striking with a keli varzel ('iron implement'). Iron objects are inherently lethal weapons — using one against a person signals murderous intent. The verdict formula is emphatic: rotseach hu ('he is a murderer'), mot yumat harotseach ('the murderer must certainly be put to death'). The phrase mot yumat uses the infinitive absolute construction for absolute certainty — there is no exception, no alternative sentence. Verses 16-18 establish a three-material typology of murder weapons: iron, stone, and wood.

Translator Notes

1. The second murder category: striking with even yad ('a hand-held stone') asher yamut bah ('with which one could die'). The qualifier 'capable of causing death' is legally significant — it distinguishes between a pebble (incapable of killing, thus not evidence of murderous intent) and a boulder or large rock (capable of killing, thus evidence of intent). The size and lethality of the weapon factor into the determination of intent, a surprisingly sophisticated jurisprudential principle.

Translator Notes

1. The third murder category: a keli ets-yad ('hand-held wooden implement') capable of killing. The three materials — iron (v 16), stone (v 17), wood (v 18) — cover essentially every possible murder weapon in the ancient world. In each case, using an implement known to be lethal establishes the presumption of intent. The repeated verdict formula rotseach hu, mot yumat harotseach creates a legal refrain — an unmistakable judicial pronouncement echoing three times.

Key Terms

Translator Notes

1. The go'el haddam ('blood avenger,' literally 'redeemer of the blood') is now formally introduced with his execution authority. The go'el is the designated kinsman who bears responsibility for the slain relative's blood. The phrase hu yamit et-harotseach ('he himself shall put the murderer to death') and befig'o-vo hu yemitennu ('when he encounters him, he shall put him to death') grants the go'el direct execution authority after the community has established guilt. This is not vigilante justice — it operates within the framework of communal adjudication (v 24), with the go'el serving as the appointed executioner.

Translator Notes

1. Two additional indicators of murderous intent beyond weapon type: besin'ah yehdofennu ('shoves him out of hatred') and hishlikh alav bitsediyyah ('hurls something at him with premeditation'). The word sin'ah ('hatred') establishes the emotional motive, while tsediyyah ('ambush, premeditation, lying in wait') establishes prior planning. Together, motive and premeditation determine whether a killing constitutes murder or manslaughter — the Hebrew legal system evaluates both the physical act and the mental state behind it.

Translator Notes

1. Even bare-handed killing qualifies as murder when accompanied by eivah ('hostility, enmity'). The phrase hikkahu veyado ('struck him with his hand/fist') shows that no weapon is necessary for a murder conviction — intent is what matters. The repeated conclusion go'el haddam yamit et-harotseach befig'o-vo ('the blood avenger shall put the murderer to death when he encounters him') establishes the go'el as the appointed executioner in all proven murder cases. Verses 16-21 collectively define murder by three criteria: lethal weapon, prior hatred, or hostile premeditation.

Translator Notes

1. The legal pivot to manslaughter: befeta ('suddenly, unexpectedly') and belo eivah ('without hostility'). These two conditions — impulsiveness without malice — distinguish accidental killing from murder. The parallel phrase belo tsediyyah ('without premeditation, without lying in wait') in the same sentence reinforces that no prior planning or ambush was involved. This verse directly mirrors verse 20, using the same verbs (hadaf — 'shove,' hishlikh — 'hurl') but negating the indicators of intent. The identical actions can constitute either murder or manslaughter depending entirely on the mental state.

Translator Notes

1. An additional manslaughter scenario: killing with a stone belo re'ot ('without seeing' the victim) — the element of accident is paramount. The classic case: a person drops or throws a lethal object without knowing someone is below. The key exculpatory factors are stated explicitly: vehu lo oyev lo ('he was not his enemy') and velo mevaqesh ra'ato ('he was not seeking to harm him'). The absence of enmity, malice, and premeditation collectively define unintentional homicide. The legal system examines the killer's relationship to the victim and the killer's prior intentions.

Translator Notes

1. The community (edah) serves as judge: veshaftu ha'edah bein hammakkeh uvein go'el haddam ('the community shall judge between the striker and the blood avenger'). This establishes communal adjudication — neither the victim's family nor the killer decides the case unilaterally. The phrase al hamishpatim ha'elleh ('according to these regulations') binds the court to the specific legal criteria outlined in the preceding verses (vv 16-23). The law constrains both the go'el (who might kill an innocent manslayer) and the killer (who might escape just punishment).

Translator Notes

1. If the killing is ruled unintentional, the community must intervene: vehitsilu ha'edah et-harotseach miyyad go'el haddam ('the community shall rescue the killer from the hand of the blood avenger'). The verb hitsilu ('rescue, deliver') casts the community as the manslayer's protector against the go'el's vengeance. The manslayer is returned to his ir miqlato ('his city of refuge') with a crucial condition: veyashav bah ad-mot haKohen haGadol ('he shall dwell in it until the death of the high priest') who was mashach oto beshemen haqqodesh ('anointed with the sacred oil'). The high priest's death functions as a kind of atonement — his passing somehow covers the unintentional bloodshed and releases the manslayer from exile.

Translator Notes

1. A critical limitation: im yatso yetse harotseach et-gevul ir miqlato ('if the killer going out goes out beyond the boundary of his city of refuge'). The doubled verb yatso yetse ('going out, he goes out') is an infinitive absolute construction emphasizing any departure, however brief or for whatever reason. The city of refuge is simultaneously a sanctuary and a prison — protection comes with the constraint of confinement within its borders.

Translator Notes

1. If the go'el haddam finds the manslayer michuts ligevul ir miqlato ('outside the border of his city of refuge') and kills him — ein lo dam ('there is no blood upon him'), meaning the blood avenger bears no bloodguilt. The manslayer forfeited his protection by stepping beyond the designated boundary. The stark phrase ein lo dam ('no blood on him') is the same legal formula used to absolve someone of responsibility for a death — the blood of the manslayer will not be charged to the avenger's account.

Translator Notes

1. The principle is restated with its temporal boundary: be'ir miqlato yeshev ad-mot haKohen haGadol ('in his city of refuge he shall dwell until the death of the high priest'). After the high priest's death: yashuv harotseach el-erets achuzzato ('the killer may return to the land of his property holding'). The high priest's death inaugurates a kind of release — his passing functions analogously to a jubilee, restoring the manslayer to full freedom and property rights. The connection between the high priest's death and the manslayer's release remains one of the most debated points in Jewish legal commentary.

Translator Notes

1. The closing formula establishes permanent jurisdiction: lechuqqat mishpat ledoroteikhem bekhol moshevoteikhem ('as a statute of judgment throughout your generations in all your settlements'). The term chuqqat mishpat ('statute of judgment, legal ordinance') combines chuqqah ('enacted statute') with mishpat ('judgment, justice, legal decision'), creating a compound that means 'enacted legal standard.' The legislation applies universally in time (ledoroteikhem — 'throughout your generations') and space (bekhol moshevoteikhem — 'in all your dwelling places').

Translator Notes

1. Two procedural safeguards: first, execution requires lefi edim ('on the mouth of witnesses' — plural, meaning multiple witnesses); second, ed echad lo ya'aneh venefesh lamut ('one witness shall not testify against a person for death'). The minimum of two witnesses prevents a single individual from weaponizing the justice system through false accusation. This principle becomes foundational in all subsequent Jewish law (cf. Deuteronomy 17:6, 19:15) and is echoed in the New Testament requirement for corroborating testimony (Matthew 18:16, 2 Corinthians 13:1).

Translator Notes

1. The prohibition velo tiqchu kofer lenefesh rotseach ('you shall not accept a ransom for the life of a murderer') blocks the wealthy from purchasing immunity from capital punishment. The kofer ('ransom, compensation payment') was standard in property disputes and some injury cases, but human life taken through murder cannot be monetarily compensated. The phrase asher hu rasha lamut ('who is guilty to death' — who deserves the death penalty) uses rasha ('guilty, wicked') as a legal verdict. The ki mot yumat ('he must certainly be put to death') closes all escape routes for the convicted murderer.

Translator Notes

1. The same prohibition extends to the manslayer in exile: velo tiqchu kofer lanus el-ir miqlato lashuv lashevet ba'arets ad-mot haKohen ('you shall not accept ransom for the one who has fled to his city of refuge, to return to dwell in the land until the death of the priest'). No payment can substitute for the required period of exile — the manslayer cannot buy early release. Both murderer (v 31) and manslayer (v 32) are placed beyond the reach of monetary influence — the system resists corruption and ensures that justice in capital cases cannot be purchased.

Key Terms

Translator Notes

1. The theological foundation for the entire chapter: velo tachanifu et-ha'arets ('you shall not pollute the land'). The verb ch-n-f means 'to pollute, make profane, corrupt' — the same root used in Jeremiah 3:1, 9 for land corrupted by covenant unfaithfulness. Unpunished bloodshed contaminates the physical soil: ki haddam hu yachanif et-ha'arets ('for it is the blood that pollutes the land'). The decisive principle: vela'arets lo yekhuppar laddam asher shupakh-bah ki im bedam shofkho ('the land cannot receive atonement for blood shed on it except by the blood of the one who shed it'). In the Hebrew worldview, spilled blood cries from the ground (Genesis 4:10) and the land itself demands justice. Only the killer's blood can purge the defilement his act introduced.

Translator Notes

1. The climactic rationale: velo tetamme et-ha'arets ('do not defile the land') — using tame ('ritually defile') alongside the previous chanaf ('morally pollute') to indicate that bloodshed creates both moral and ritual contamination. The critical phrase: asher ani shokhen betokhah ('in which I dwell'). God's residence in the land makes its purity a personal divine concern. The closing declaration ki ani YHVH shokhen betokh benei Yisra'el ('for I the LORD dwell among the Israelites') grounds the entire legal system in God's presence — the divine Resident demands that His dwelling place remain uncontaminated by unresolved bloodshed. The pe paragraph marker closes this major legal section and the penultimate chapter of Numbers.